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Abstract
It is relatively well known that the introduction of consumption taxation
as an alternative in the tax code, and as the main source of government
revenues, leads to a more eﬃcient tax system.
However the conventional wisdom is that the change from the actual
tax code, based on taxation of capital and labor income to this consump-
tion based system, has undesirable distributional consequences. In this
work a very simple method is developed to argue that the converse is the
most reasonable outcome from that fundamental tax reform. The main
diﬀerence in relation to the literature comes from the assumed source of
household heterogeneity. Additionally it is shown that the inclusion of a
tax on consumption allows for redistributive policies with no costs in terms
of eﬃciency.(JEL: D63, E62, H20)
1. Introduction
Although tax reforms are a recurrent phenomena in every developed economy for
the last decades, most tax codes are characterized by extremely complex rules
mainly around business taxes and personal taxation of income. The high costs
involved with such systems motivated concerns from politicians and academics,
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represent those of the Banco de Portugal.leading to a broad discussion on the advantages of a fundamental tax reform. One
goal of such reform would be to simplify the existing systems. There has been some
consensus on the adoption of a system that favors a ﬂat tax1. The most commonly
expressed objection to this radical reform proposal concerns its distributional
consequences. A representative quote is Robert McIntyre, from ’Citizens for Tax
Justice’: ”there is little or no disagreement among serious analysts that replacing
the current, progressive income tax with a ﬂat tax would dramatically shift the
burden of taxation from the wealthy- and onto the middle class and the poor”
(see Slemrod and Bakija (1996)).
The objective of this paper is to discuss the eﬀects on equity of a change from
the existing tax systems, based on capital and labor taxation, to a system based on
consumption taxation. We want to stress the distributional eﬀects of the reform
of taxation across agents with diﬀerent levels of welfare.
There are some very detailed studies of the impact of this type of reform for the
U.S. economy. Examples are Gentry and Hubbard (1997) and Feenberg, Mitrusi
and Poterba (1997). These works compute the distribution of tax burdens under
alternative tax regimes, using very sophisticated data bases on household port-
folio composition, the ﬁrst one, and on consumption, income and tax liabilities,
the second. Although these studies have a very detailed description of household
position they do not include the general equilibrium eﬀects of the tax reform.
Tax burdens are equivalent to tax liabilities for diﬀerent income and consumption
groups. A diﬀerent approach in the literature take into account the general equi-
librium eﬀects of the reform. The emphasis is on the intergenerational eﬀects of
the reform. Two exceptions are Fullerton and Rogers (1996) and Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen (1997) which allow for diﬀerent income levels within each generation.
Both are limited to the long run eﬀects and conclude for the regressivity of the
reform. Examples of work that compute the whole transition path are Altig et al
(2001), that impose an exogenous amount of debt over time across reforms, being
its main contribution the formalization of intragenerational heterogeneity in a dy-
namic life cycle model and the speciﬁc calibration for the U.S. tax code. The other
example is Ventura (1999) that compares distributions by income and wealth and
not by welfare. Both studies consider the main cause of heterogeneity being ex-
ogenously given labor eﬃciency. Other studies, like Krusell et al (1996), make an
exercise similar with the last part of this paper: taxes are used to ﬁnance transfers
but there transfers are endogenous. That study use a political-equilibrium theory
and conclude that the median voter can be worse-oﬀ and that "a change from
1Hall and Rabushka (1995) it is perhaps the most well known proposal of a ﬂat tax system.
2income to consumption taxes may make everybody worse oﬀ".
This study focuses on the whole eﬀect, transition plus steady state, when the
general equilibrium eﬀects are clearly taken into account. And the main question
raised is the eﬀects on equity of the introduction on the tax system of a con-
sumption tax. The main results derive from the comparison of lifetime welfare
distributions associated with several diﬀerent compositions of ﬁscal instruments.
We diﬀerentiate from Altig et al (2001) on building a much simpler structure. In
that way we get a clearer understanding of the main channels through which a
change in taxation aﬀect welfare distribution and of the importance for the results
of the type of exogenous heterogeneity imposed across agents. In addition the re-
sults are robust to very diﬀerent distributions of the exogenous heterogeneity. In
a ﬁrst step we compare the welfare distribution when a system characterized by
taxing capital and labor at diﬀerent rates is substituted by a regime that does
not tax capital. The ﬁnancing of public expenditures results at this stage from a
ﬂat tax on consumption and on labor income. We show that, if the share that is
ﬁnanced by the consumption tax is high enough, and clearly when the only tax
is the consumption tax, equity improves relatively to the initial system. These
results are computed using a general equilibrium model that replicates the usual
long run characteristics of the U.S. economy. The method used to compute the
eﬀects on equity is very parsimonious in terms of cross section information. To
replicate the main characteristics of US cross section data (see Diaz-Gimenez et al
(2002)) heterogeneity comes from asymmetries on wealth and on labor eﬃciency,
and wealth distribution is more concentrated than earnings. These mild assump-
tions are enough to allow us to get the result that a reform that eliminates the
tax on every type of income and ﬁnances public expenditures exclusively with
consumption taxation, improves equity and increases always the welfare of those
households that are worse oﬀ than the average of the population. In a second
step we show, for the same assumptions on heterogeneity, the eﬀects of introduc-
ing deductions on the tax code. These deductions work like lump-sum transfers
b e c a u s ew ei m p o s et h a tt h e ya r en o td i ﬀerentiated across households. We show
that we can use the tax on consumption and the tax on labor income to ﬁnance
these transfers in a way that eﬃciency is maintained and equity improves monoto-
nously with the amount transferred to every household. Then the main result of
this work is that the a tax reform which introduces consumption taxation together
with an anonymous deduction can improve equity and eﬃciency and can there-
fore guarantee that at least the welfare of households with welfare lower than the
average of the economy will be better oﬀ with that reform.
3The paper is organized in the following way: in the next section we develop
analytically some equivalence results for diﬀerent tax codes. These equivalences
allows us to present some results on eﬃciency and to conjecture on the eﬀects
that the tax on consumption can have on equity. Section 3 derives the eﬀects
on distribution of the change to a ﬂat tax on consumption. In the ﬁrst part
the eﬀects on equity of ﬁnancing public expenditures predominantly with a tax
o nc o n s u m p t i o na r ed e r i v e dw i t han u m e r i c a lm o d e l . T h ee ﬀects on equity of
introducing lump-sum and uniform transfers ﬁnanced with consumption taxation
are derived afterwards analytically. Section 4 concludes.
2. Equivalence Results
In this section we develop the intuition that the advantage of a ﬁscal code that
includes a tax on consumption comes from the fact that with this tax it is possible
to replicate equilibria identical to the one where the government could diﬀerentiate
across agents, in a non distortionary way. The possibility of introducing a tax on
consumption on the tax code has a known advantage due to its positive impact
on eﬃciency. That is, the tax burden of ﬁnancing a given path of government
expenditures is reduced when compared to the one based on income taxation. In
this section, and using an equivalence result, we explain this result in a very simple
way. Using this equivalence result we can make the conjecture that by giving a
bigger role to consumption taxation in tax codes we can aim at a more equitable
system, simultaneously with a more eﬃcient one.
Our set up is one of a non-monetary deterministic economy where markets
are competitive2. For simplicity we will suppose that the only distortion that
exists in this economy comes from the fact that public consumption, which is
exogenous, has to be ﬁnanced with distortionary taxation, or with lump-sum taxes
which cannot discriminate across households. Preferences are identical across
households, indexed by i, and deﬁned over a sequence of aggregate consumption
goods, {Cit}∞
t=0, and over a sequence of hours of work, {Nit}∞
t=0. Diversity across
agents in the economy results from diﬀerent initial assets holdings, i.e. wealth that
can be accumulated, mainly physical capital and bonds3,a sw e l la sf r o md i ﬀerent
2These constrains on the environment are irrelevant for the results. That monetary
economies, nominal rigidities and market imperfections are irrelevant for this result is proved in
Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2004).
3We could also have human capital as an asset that could be chosen after period zero. This
would imply that the technology would depend on human capital. For simplicity we consider
4labor eﬃciency levels which are exogenous to agents decisions. Households are
price takers and anonymous in the markets, which implies that every individual
faces identical prices. Government has no information about the characteristics
that diﬀerentiate agents so it treats every agent also anonymously, that is the
tax rates on capital income, labor income and consumption, and the amount
of transfers (when these are introduced) are identical across households. The
exercises that are performed in this work compare ﬁscal policies that are invariant
over time, i.e. tax rates and transfers are constant over time.
Then the intertemporal budget constraint for agent i c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
∞ X
t=0
dt(1 + τc)Cit =
∞ X
t=0
dt [(1 − τn)wtEiNit + Tr]+( 1+ro)Aio (2.1)
where d,w, τc,τ n,T r ,and ro represent, respectively the discount factor (net of
the tax on capital) and the gross real wage at period t, the tax rate on consump-
tion, the tax rate on labor income, the amount of transfers from the government,
and the net real return on initial wealth.E i and Aio represent the exogenous fac-
tors that diﬀerentiate agents in this economy. Ei is the labor eﬃciency level of
agent i and Aio represents the initial level of non-human wealth of agent i,t h a t
is, the endowment that, together with Ei, diﬀerentiates agents in this economy.
Prices, p = {dt,w t,τc,τn}
∞
t=0 and ro, and transfers are exogenous to the indi-
vidual household. The anonymity of households implies that the government is
not able to raise revenue (or make transfers) designed for a special individual i.
Discriminatory lump-sum taxes and transfers are therefore excluded from the tax
code.
The results of this section are developed by the construction of a tax system
equivalent to another one that includes a tax on consumption. The ﬁrst system,
which is used just for derivation of results given its tractability, includes a levy on
initial wealth. Let us call this virtual discriminatory levy L. This tax applied on
initial wealth implies that every agent pays a discriminatory lump-sum tax equal
to L(1 + ro)Aio.
We begin by showing the equivalence that exists between this discriminatory
lump-sum tax and the tax on consumption.
Deﬁnition 1: Two tax codes with diﬀerent tax instruments are equivalent when
they decentralize the same equilibrium (aggregate and individual allocations and
prices gross of taxes).
that just raw non-accumulated labor and physical capital are productive.
5We diﬀerentiate tax codes by its instruments. Tax code f is a vector which
elements are ordered as follows: the tax rate on consumption, the tax rate on
labor income, the tax rate on capital income, the annual per capita transfer and
the initial levy.
Lemma 1:T h et a xc o d efA =( τA
c ,τA
n,τA
K,TrA,0) is equivalent to the virtual4
ﬁscal policy fB =( τB
c ,τB
n,τB











K,Tr B = TrA
Φ , and 1 − L = 1
Φ, where Φ > 1.
Proof. Policy fA is characterized by a higher tax on consumption than policy























B)+( 1+ro)(1 − L)Aio (2.3)
Individual ﬁrst order conditions are identical under policy fA or fB. For the
same resources constraint, including the same path of government expenditures,
equilibrium prices gross of taxes should be identical in both cases. Aggregate
and individual allocations are also identical and the two policies are therefore
equivalent.
In this work we impose that, although households diﬀer, the economy is still
amenable to Gorman aggregation5. A representative household, i = r, can be
deﬁned which determines the aggregate equilibrium allocations and prices, inde-
pendently on the individual distribution of characteristics and therefore indepen-
dently of individual allocations and welfare. Labor eﬃciency is normalized such
that w represents the wage rate of the representative agent, that is Er =1 .
4Virtual because it includes the discriminatory tax that cannot be available in the potential
code.
5The conditions for the existence of this representative agent are related in part with con-
ditions already imposed and in part with the choice of parameters of preferences that we do in
section 3. Until now we imposed the anonymity of agents in the market and for the government.
This assumption leads to net prices identical across agents that is a necessary condition for
Gorman aggregation.
6Deﬁnition 2: Eﬃciency is measured by the welfare of the representative house-
hold. Namely a change of policy leads to an increase of eﬃciency when the welfare
of the representative agent is higher in the equilibrium associated with the second
policy.
We can write a corollary of lemma 1 that states the very strong result that
the inclusion of a tax rate on consumption can eliminate any distortions in the
ﬁnancing of public consumption:
Corollary (Coleman (2000)): A policy that taxes consumption and subsidizes
l a b o ra tt h es a m er a t e ,i .e .t h ep o l i c yf =(τ,−τ,0,0,0), with τ such that the
intertemporal government budget is satisﬁed, leads to a ﬁrst best equilibrium.6
Proof. Using lemma 1 this policy is equivalent to the virtual policy fV =
(0,0,0,0,L), that is to a policy that ﬁnances public expenditures only with taxes
that are equivalent to a lump sum tax. Since it implies no distortions the economy
achieves the ﬁrst best.
This policy recommendation was abandoned for long in the literature because
in static models it delivers zero revenues. However it has a completely new role
in dynamic models with capital, as the one we study here. However, as Coleman
(2000) notes, the policy recommendation that labor should be subsidized it is
diﬃcult to implement due to high (perhaps inﬁnite) costs of veriﬁcation of hours of
work. When the restriction that labor income taxes cannot be negative is imposed,
this restriction is active and the ﬁrst best is no longer achievable. We therefore
compare in eﬃciency terms a sequence of policies where taxes on consumption are
increasing and labor taxes cannot be negative.
Proposition 1: The increase of the tax on consumption to ﬁnance an exogenous
stream of government expenditures, when the alternative tax is a non negative
tax on labor income, leads always to an increase in eﬃciency.
Proof. Let us suppose that the tax on capital as well as transfers, τK and
Tr, are zero and that the government budget is ﬁnanced with a constant tax on
consumption (τ1
c) and a constant tax on labor income, (τ1
n). This tax policy is to
be compared with another one where the budget is ﬁnanced with a higher tax on
consumption, (τ2
c >τ 1
c), and with a lower tax on labor income (τ1
n >τ 2
n).
Using lemma 1, policy 1, f1 =( τ1
c,τ1
n,0,0), is equivalent to the virtual policy
f1V =( 0 ,τ1V
n ,0,0,L 1), and policy 2, f2 =( τ2
c,τ2
n,0,0), is equivalent to the virtual
policy f2V =( 0 ,τ2V
n ,0,0,L 2). As τ2
c >τ 1
c then L2 >L 1. Since we impose that
τ1
n,τ2
n > 0, policy 2 is more eﬃcient than policy 1, because public consumption is
6See Coleman (2000) for a diﬀerent proof of this result.
7ﬁnanced with a lower distortionary tax.7
Corollary: If we restrict the tax rate on labor income to be non negative the
most eﬃcient policy is to tax exclusively consumption, that is f =( τc,0,0,0) 8.
The idea of this paper is to use the equivalence result of lemma1 for comparing
policies with diﬀerent taxes on consumption (and labor income), by its distributive
eﬀects. As shown in Proposition 1 a change that increases the tax on consumption
and decreases the tax on labor is equivalent to a change that taxes labor income
at a lower rate and at a higher rate initial assets. When the main heterogeneity
across households is initial wealth, it is natural to conjecture that this increase
of the tax rate on consumption lead to a more equitable solution. As we just
showed that change of policy increases eﬃciency. We can also conjecture that it
will increases the welfare of households located to the left of the distribution, that
is those whose welfare is lower than the average. Nevertheless, as distributional
eﬀects also depend on the eﬀects on equilibrium prices of the change in policy,
that conjecture has to be carefully tested using a complete general equilibrium
model. This is the subject of next section.
3. Increasing the tax on consumption
The conjecture that a substitution of the consumption tax for the existing system,
based on capital and labor income tax, improves equity will be tested in a general
equilibrium model with heterogenous agents. We have already showed that, if
capital taxation was zero, the elimination of the tax on labor income and its sub-
stitution by a tax on consumption increases eﬃciency. We consider that the initial
system ﬁnances an exogenous stream of public consumption with a tax on capital
and a tax on labor income. One of the abstractions from the existing systems is
that although the tax on capital income diﬀers from the tax on labor income we
impose a unique tax of either type. We also consider that the system does not use
transfers (lump sum transfers) or deductions. After showing the results of moving
7The intuition of the result is very similar to the one in Helpman and Sadka (1982). There
the lump sum taxation is obtained through the implicit taxation of proﬁts given the decreasing
returns to scale technology.
8In this case, where the tax code imposes non negative taxes on labor, the optimal constant
tax on capital is in theory positive such that the initial levy can be used to reduce the distortions
of the system. Nevertheless, quantitatively, this optimal tax rate is approximately zero (see
Coleman (2000)). Coleman also shows that the decline in eﬃciency due to the imposition of a
non negative tax on labor is small, mainly when compared with the gain of introducing the tax
on consumption.
8to codes that use just a consumption tax, we introduce transfers (or deductions)
and analyze their role, when its ﬁnancing is performed with consumption taxes.
As we said before the set up is such that the aggregate equilibrium can be repli-
cated by the representative household paradigm. We describe below how we can
take advantage of these assumption to understand the eﬀects on equity, that is on
welfare distribution.
3.1. The model
The economy is described by a set of heterogeneous households with inﬁnite life
indexed by i =1 ,...,I. The preferences of every household can be described by










,σ>0,χ > 0,ϕ>1 (3.1)
where Ci and Ni represent respectively agent i choices for consumption and work
hours.
Each household maximizes the utility function (3.1), subject to the budget
constraint, represented by equation (2.2).
This class of utility functions is not homothetic in C and N. However it is
quasi-homothetic in consumption, as we proceed to show. The households optimal
decision can be solved in two stages: In a ﬁrst stage, the number of hours of
work in each period is computed. The equalization of the intratemporal rate of
substitution and the real wage rate leads to the determination of the choice of







This ﬁrst order condition reﬂects the fact that, for this class of preferences, there
are no wealth eﬀects on labor supply. Labor supply, in a given period, depends
9To guarantee aggregation, it is necessary to impose that either the momentary utility func-
tion is homogeneous in Cit −Ct and 1−Nit, or is additive and linear in at least one argument.
We chose to use the class of utility functions proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman
(1988), since, in opposition to the isoelastic representation, it allows the replication of cross
section data. For a discussion see Correia (1999c). Nevertheless, the qualitative results are not
aﬀected by the choice of this functional form for preferences.
9exclusively on the net wage rate and the tax rate on consumption. Since the
households face identical prices this implies that labor choices by poor and rich
households coincide, for identical values of the eﬃciency level, Ei.I n t h i s c a s e
poor and rich agents are diﬀerentiated exclusively by their consumption decisions.
If rich agents have higher labor eﬃciency levels they choose to work more hours
than poor agents do. In any case the decision rules on hours of work are either
identical across agents or linear in Ei
1
ϕ−1, and therefore can be aggregated for the
whole economy.
In a second stage, the number of work hours is replaced in the utility function
by the supply of labor, and the problem of optimal consumption is solved for a












This representation of preferences, homogeneous in (Cit − Cit),s h o w st h a tt h e
original preferences are quasi-homothetic in consumption. The budget constraint,
































the optimal decision rules of Cit − Cit can be computed for t =0 ,...,∞.It is
straightforward to show that consumption decision rules are, for every agent and
time period, aﬃne in Ei
ϕ
ϕ−1 and in Aio.
It is well known that the advantage of assuming aggregation comes from the
fact that the aggregate equilibrium of this economy, and therefore the equilibrium
prices, can be obtained without keeping track of the individual optimal decisions.
For the representative agent (i = r) optimal rules are identical to the ones derived



























r are deﬁned as the ”average” index of the eﬃciency level relevant
respectively for the consumption decisions and for the hours of work decisions.
In order to characterize the aggregate general equilibrium, more information
on the set up is necessary. The technology is described by a neoclassical produc-
tion function Yt = F(Kt,N rt),w h e r eKt represents the average stock of physical
capital. There is a constant proportional depreciation rate, δ, and there are no
adjustment costs, in capital accumulation. The government is characterized by
per capita expenditures, Gt, and tax rates, τc,τn, and τk, respectively, taxes on
consumption, labor income and capital income net of depreciation. The taxes
are ﬂat and constant over time. Transfers per period are represented by Tr,a n d
initial per capita public debt by Bg
o.
The aggregate equilibrium is deﬁned by a sequence of per capita quantities -
Crt, Nrt, and Kt and prices, pt = {dt,w t}
∞
t=0 , that satisfy the decision rules of the
representative agent together with10
Yt = F(Kt,N rt)=Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + Crt + Gt












t=o dtτk(F1t − δ)Kt
d0 =1
dt = 1 Tt
s=o(1+rs),t > 0
rt =( 1− τk)(F1t − δ)
wt = F2t
10Fj(.) is the partial derivative of F(.) with respect to the jth argument.
11Preferences, technology, initial average wealth and government policy, deter-
mine the aggregate general equilibrium, without information on the distribution
of initial wealth, Aio, or on the distribution of eﬃciency levels, Ei.11
The eﬀects on equity of the tax reform are measured through the eﬀects of wel-



























Note that this indirect utility function is a transformation of an expression that
is aﬃne on Ei
ϕ
ϕ−1 and Aio.This property is a direct consequence of the conditions
imposed for aggregation, namely that agents face the same prices and the assumed
class of preferences, and it will be very important to allow for welfare distributions
comparisons in a straightforward way.
3.2. The method12
In models amenable to Gorman aggregation, the indirect utility for agent i can
be represented by H(Vi)=vi = α(p)+γ(p)ei, where ei represent the endowments
on which agents diﬀer.
In order to compare the indirect utility index between any two households, i
and j, the ratio vi/vj, is computed. The choice of an aﬃne representation for the
indirect utility amounts to saying that the ratio between agent i0s and agent j0s
consumption of every good, or consumption of transformed good (C − C) as in
our case, coincides with the ratio of life time utilities. The value of this ratio is
the answer to the question: How much would the consumption of agent i have to
grow, so that agent j would be indiﬀerent to change its position with agent i?I t
is in the sense of using the consumption equivalent criteria, that we can say that
interpersonal utility comparisons are free from cardinality.
To rank policies by their distributional eﬀects is to compare the vectors of in-
dividual utilities. We compare changes in inequality induced by diﬀerent policies,
11To calibrate Ec
r and EN
r it is necessary information on time series average of labor income
and hours of work.
12This method, that determines the eﬀects of equilibrium changes on distributions, is devel-
oped in Correia (1999b).
12by ordering the v distributions using the relative diﬀerential concept.13 Then pol-
icy 1 dominates policy 2 if and only if the percentage increase in consumption of
a poor agent necessary to equalize his consumption with any richer agent is lower
in policy 1 than in policy 2. The individual welfare indicator and the inequality
criterion chosen imply that the inequality ranking is, in the sense defended before,
free from interpersonal utility comparisons.
In Correia (1999b) it is shown that
v








when heterogeneity across households can be reduced to one dimension.
The advantage of this method is the possibility to infer qualitative distribu-
tional eﬀects of policy reforms, with no explicit knowledge on the distribution of
characteristics of agents in the economy. Since in our model economy agents diﬀer
by two dimensions we will analyze separately two cases:
Case A:H o u s e h o l d sd i ﬀer exclusively by the stock of initial non human wealth.
In this case, Ei =1and ei ≡ Aio.
Then using (3.5) the eﬀect on distribution will be determined in this case by






















Case B:H o u s e h o l d sd i ﬀer on the stock of accumulated wealth as well as on the









Aro, i.e., the consumption index
of labor eﬃciency is perfectly correlated with initial non-human wealth across
individuals.











For any two distibutions, Lorenz dominance implies relative diﬀerential dominance and relative
diﬀerential dominance is equivalent to Lorenz dominance for every partition of the population
set.
13Using (3.5) to rank policies by inequality the following expression has to be



















ϕ−1 (1 − 1
ϕ)
.
Notice that, in this case, if Tr =0 , this ratio is always identical to zero,
and it is therefore independent of the policy. An economy characterized by this
heterogeneity and by a tax code that does not include transfers, will have no eﬀect
on welfare distribution when tax policy changes.
The reason to focus on these two extreme cases is related to the empirical
evidence on cross section data. The literature on this question (see e. g. Diaz-
Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2002)) concludes that concentration is higher in
wealth than in income, and that these two variable are correlated. Therefore het-
erogeneity should come mainly from potentially accumulated assets and a smaller
share to exogenous characteristics of agents. In our characterization the economy
distribution should be between cases A and B. This assumption is relevant for the
diﬀerence between our results and most of the comparable literature.
3.3. The ﬂat consumption tax
In this section we determine the eﬀect on inequality of a sequence of tax reforms
in which the importance of the taxation of consumption increases. The ﬁnal code
consists uniquely of a constant and uniform tax on every consumption good. In
the whole exercise the level of government expenditures per period is maintained
constant. In this sense the exercise is revenue neutral. Here we assume that
transfers (or deductions) do not belong to the possible set of ﬁscal instruments.
Most actual tax codes include taxes on capital and on labor income. This status
quo policy is simpliﬁed in the model by assuming that these taxes are ﬂat and
uniform. 14 The ﬁrst exercise is the substitution of the status quo system by a
system that does not rely on taxes on capital. Therefore we begin by eliminating
the tax on capital income and by ﬁnancing the government budget exclusively
through a tax on labor income. This new system with no taxes on capital income
is then compared with systems where the same sequence of public expenditures
14The type of heterogeneity stressed in this work, wealth and labor eﬃciency heterogeneity,
and the chosen initial values for the ﬂat tax on capital income and labor income implies that
the status quo system has a marginal tax rate that is increasing in income.
14is ﬁnanced with higher taxes on consumption and lower taxes on labor. The last
reform is the change to a system where the ﬁnancing is done exclusively through
the taxation of consumption.
The described model is calibrated so that the initial tax code, τk = .515,
τn = .23, and τc =0is consistent with N = .25 and G/Y = .19. Preferences
are such the ϕ =1 .8,χ=2 .34,σ=1 .001 and β = .96. The technology is Cobb
Douglas, the share of capital is .4 and depreciation rate is .1. As referred before the
annual value of government expenditures derived from this model is maintained
in every alternative tax code.
The steady state associated with the initial tax code, τk = .5,τ n = .23 and
τc =0 , deﬁnes the status quo situation of this economy. In the ﬁrst alternative
scenario the taxation on capital income is eliminated and labor is taxed at a con-
stant rate such that the present value of the exogenous government expenditures
is equal to the present value of labor tax revenues. The labor tax rate that ac-
commodates that solution is τn = .35. In the following scenarios, we allow for an
increase of the tax on consumption. The second alternative scenario is character-
ized by a consumption tax rate .14 a n db yat a xo nl a b o ri n c o m eo f.21.I nt h e
third scenario the tax rate on consumption rises to .18 and the tax on labor is
reduced to .15. The last scenario is constructed such that the tax rate on labor
income is zero and the tax rate of consumption of .29 is able to ﬁnance the annual
value of government expenditures.
In order to compute these alternative aggregate equilibria it was not necessary
to make any assumption on the heterogeneity across agents. The average stock of
ﬁnancial wealth, Aro, is the one consistent with the steady state of the status quo
and we assumed that the average eﬃciency level is 1. The equilibrium trajectory
of the economy associated with each one of the alternative tax codes is computed
including the transition path to the new steady state. To proceed on the eﬀects on
distribution of these alternative policies, assumptions on the heterogeneity have
to be made. As stated above when transfers are zero and the diﬀerent stocks of
initial wealth are perfectly correlated with E
ϕ
1−ϕ
i , case B, changes in policy will
have no eﬀects on distribution. Therefore we will report just the eﬀects on (3.6),
that is households diﬀer on initial wealth but labor eﬃciency levels are identical,
i.e. Ei = Er =1 , case A.
If agents diﬀer only on ﬁnancial wealth we can use the numerical solution of
this model to compare any two policies by inequality. If the following inequality
is satisﬁed































then v1 Ârd v2 , and the change from policy 2 to policy 1 reduces inequality.16
The following table summarizes the numerical results that allow the ranking
policies by inequality:















taxes τc =0 τc =0 τc = .14 τc = .18 τc = .29
Distribution
eﬀects 3.8 2.9 3.7 4.0 4.8









for each policy. After policy 4, τN = .15,τK =0and τc = .18, the inequality
decreases, when compared with the status quo. In this example the substitution of
the tax on capital and labor by a tax on consumption increases always eﬃciency17,
and it reduces inequality when the tax on consumption is relevant in the tax code.
Remember that these eﬀects on inequality occur when the population is diﬀer-
entiated by diﬀerent initial wealth (case A). When the heterogeneity is not only
on ﬁnancial wealth but also on labor eﬃciency, and these two dimensions are per-
fectly correlated, there are no eﬀects on distribution ( case B).I n t h i s c a s e f o r







16It is immediate to see that, if agents diﬀer exclusively on labor eﬃciency, the inequality
should have the opposite signal to guarantee the improvement in distribution.
17The ﬁrst change in policy, the elimination of the tax on capital income does not always
increase eﬃciency. The chosen numerical example implies an increase of eﬃciency. The subse-
quent reforms, increases of the tax on consumption and declining the tax on labor, have always
a positive eﬀect on eﬃciency. (see Proposition 1).
16In this case the change of tax codes, and the resulting change of equilibrium
prices in the economy, has no eﬀects on the relative diﬀerential of any two agents18.
In this case the eﬀect on welfare of every agent is proportional to the one of the
representative agent. As the sequence of policies increase always eﬃciency, the
increase of the tax on consumption leads to a Pareto movement.
Using the cross section evidence that allow us to deﬁn et h ec a s eAa n dB
as the two extreme cases that accommodate that evidence, we can summarize
the results of this section by saying that the change from a system based on
constant taxes on capital and labor income to a system based on a uniform and
constant tax rate on consumption, with no transfers, has a positive eﬀect on equity
in addition to a positive eﬀect on eﬃciency. The more the system is based on
consumption as the base of taxation, the stronger are the eﬀects on the welfare of
the agents that belong to the left part of the welfare distribution. In other words,
the poor are always better oﬀ w i t ht h ec h a n g ei np o l i c y .T h em o r ei m p o r t a n ti st h e
heterogeneity of the initial wealth relative to the labor eﬃciency for explaining the
existing diﬀerences across households, the higher the increase of welfare of these
class of agents.
In the extreme case, which we do not consider due to counterfactual cross
section properties, agents diﬀer exclusively on labor eﬃciency and the change to
a tax system based exclusively on consumption would increases inequality.
3.4. Consumption taxes with deductions - Redistribution with no losses
in eﬃciency
That a ﬁscal reform to a consumption tax has a positive eﬀect on equity was the
qualitative result derived in the above section. However we could argue that the
interess of this result should be quantitative or that it depends heavily from the
distribution at the point of departure, or the status quo. The initial system used in
the exercise was characterized as one where, although marginal taxes on labor and
capital income are constant, the marginal tax on total income is increasing. We
know that existing codes have increasing marginal taxes, even if it is often claimed
that eﬀective marginal taxes are only slightly increasing. Anyway this fact could
have characterized the abstract initial system as less equitative then the actual
one. In this section we want to claim that once we allow for deductions on the
18As stated in Slemrod and Bajika (1996), ”the fairness or unfairness of tax changes has
become such a divisive issue that ...the issue was..a package of tax provisions that could be
characterized as ”distributional neutral””. This is the characteristic of the case just described.
17t a xc o d ew ec a na i ma ta n y 19 ”desirable” level of progressivity. We could improve
the equitative gains of the reform described in the last section by introducing
deductions in the system. This novelty of the consumption tax that we also want
to stress in this paper, comes from the fact that when the government can use
deductions ﬁnanced with the consumption tax it is possible to redistribute with
no loss in eﬃciency.
The introduction in the tax code of the possibility to make deductions is equiv-
alent to introduce transfers from the government to every household. Maintaining
the discipline of avoiding discriminatory lump-sum transfers we introduce an an-
nual deduction in the tax code, identical across households. Therefore the limit
situation, the one where the taxes on labor and capital income are zero, is charac-
terized by a constant transfer (across time and across households) and a constant
tax rate on consumption (across time and across goods). This system is character-
ized by a constant marginal tax but by an increasing average tax and is therefore
a progressive system20.
We ﬁrst show how the introduction of non discriminatory transfers can have
no eﬀects on aggregate equilibrium, and therefore eﬃciency can be maintained.
Afterwards the eﬀects of these transfers on equity (or individual equilibrium) are
discussed.
Proposition 2: When the tax code includes a tax on consumption, non discrim-
inatory transfers can be increased with no eﬀect on aggregate equilibrium, and
therefore diﬀerent levels of transfers are associated to the same level of eﬃciency.
Proof. Because conditions for Gorman aggregation are satisﬁed the aggregate
equilibrium is not altered when, for the same path of public consumption, deci-
sions of the representative agent are the same. These decisions are maintained
when relative prices are the same and the same decisions satisfy the intertemporal
budget constraint of the representative agent. Suppose that the government could




dt(1 + τc)Crt =
∞ X
t=0
dt((1 − τn)wtNrt + Tr)+( 1+ro)(1 − L)Aro (3.8)
To maintain the aggregate equilibrium increasing L it is necessary that the optimal
19This desirable level is constrained if we impose a certain level of eﬃciency, due to the non-
negativity of the tax on labor income.
20The advantages of this progressive scheme are discussed in Correia (1999a).
18choices of the representative agent are not aﬀected. This is true when the amount
of the initial wealth taken by the levy is exactly identical to the additional present
value of the transfer given to the representative agent, that is when:




where ro and {dt}
∞
t=0 belong to the equilibrium prices for the policy without trans-
fers.
The equivalence results discussed in section 2 allow us to say that when the




















The change of policy that ensures that these equations are satisﬁed and there-
fore the aggregate equilibrium is maintained, as well as eﬃciency, includes an
increase of transfers, an increase of the tax on consumption and a decrease of the
tax on labor.
We just showed that if the increase of the consumption tax is used to reduce
the tax on labor but also to increase transfers the eﬃciency of the economy can
be maintained.
However the described policy, which is neutral in terms of eﬃciency, has eﬀects
on individual decisions and on individual welfare. The increase of the tax on
consumption and the decline of the tax on labor income aﬀects diﬀerent households
diﬀerently. Also the transfer, although being identical across households, aﬀects
the welfare distribution of households. To see this discriminatory eﬀect let us
again use the equivalent levy21. This levy on initial wealth, L, implies a higher
tax on rich individual, with a higher A,since the lump sum paid is given by
(1+ro)LAi. Because the transfer is the same for every household it is easy to see
that households with a higher than average welfare will have a decrease in total
net wealth and, on the contrary, households with a level of welfare lower than the
average will receive a net positive transfer in present value from the government.
As equilibrium prices are maintained these changes in net wealth are the only way
21Here the equivalence is on the individual allocation and welfare.
19individual’s welfare is aﬀected. To determine exactly the eﬀect on inequality we
use the method described above.





















+( 1+ro)(1 − L)Aio
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(3.9)
The eﬀect on equity depends on the type of heterogeneity considered. We will






















































Aro +( 1+ro)(1 − L)
It is immediate to see that an increase in L and in Trl e a d si nb o t hc a s e st oal e s s
unequal welfare distribution. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Assuming Gorman aggregation and a tax code that includes
a tax on consumption, the increase of non discriminatory transfers such that the
eﬃciency level is maintained implies a more equitative distribution of welfare.
Households located at the left of the welfare distribution, the poor, will always
increase lifetime utility.22
22It is easy to verify that even if heterogeneity would come exclusively from labor eﬃciency
this proposition is true.
20Concluding, we can say that the possibility of using higher taxes on con-
sumption to ﬁnance uniform transfers has the very important characteristic of
improving the tax code in terms of equity with no costs in eﬃciency. A redistri-
bution is possible with no eﬃciency losses even if the government does not use
discriminatory lump-sum taxes or transfers.
4. Conclusions
Fairness is the argument widely used to justify the high complexity of actual tax
regimes. The poll tax, that is the simplest tax system, is universally rejected given
its unfair characteristics. To avoid the potential complexities of the actual income
based regimes, the change to a ﬂat consumption tax is being advocated. In this
work it is discussed how the tax burden distribution change if this proposal is im-
plemented. The main conclusion is that the tax burden is more evenly distributed
under the simplest and most eﬃcient tax code- the ﬂat tax rate on consumption.
This conclusion is in sharp contrast with the one obtained on a year by year base
where poor agents have a higher consumption to income ratio than rich agents.
T h ec o n c l u s i o no ft h i sp a p e ri sb a s e do nh e t e r o g e n e o u sa g e n t sw i t hi n ﬁnite lives;
that is where bequests are a gift and the donor derives utility from the utility the
gift implies for the recipient. This is a strong result because it was derived with-
out any knowledge of the speciﬁc distribution of agents in the economy. In this
sense our approach is completely complementary with those that construct the
so called ”distributional tables” which are based on a very special distribution of
agents in the economy but do not take into account the general equilibrium eﬀects
of policy reforms. These general equilibrium eﬀe c t sa r ee s s e n t i a li nt h i ss t u d yt o
determine the revenue neutral ﬂat rate on consumption and to compute the eﬀect
on individual tax burdens measured in utility. The studied distributional eﬀects
should be interpreted as the ﬁrst round eﬀects. The hypothesis of a representative
agent implies that the diﬀerent distributions do not aﬀect equilibrium.
The second conclusion of the paper is that the consumption tax can be used
with a tax on the labor income to obtain the desired distribution of the tax
burdens with no costs in terms of eﬃciency: that is, there exists a tax mix that
can redistribute without imposing eﬃciency losses.
These two results mean that a fundamental reform that changes the tax code
from the actual one to a new characterized by a constant, across time and goods,
marginal tax rate on consumption and by a constant transfer across households
will necessarily increase eﬃciency and equity. This means that the households
21poorer than the average would be better oﬀ, but also that if there was a direct
vote on this reform, since the median is lower than the mean for the distribution
of welfare, the result of the majority for the reform. The conclusion repeated on
so many studies that the adoption of a consumption base ”entails a radical shift
in tax burden from the aﬄuent to poor and middle class income families” (see
Slemrod and Bakija (1996) page 232) is not a robust statement.
To get this result we use the exogenous heterogeneity suggested by the cross
section data and therefore we impose that agents are diﬀerentiated by initial
assets, that can be accumulated, and by exogenous labor eﬃciency, that cannot
be accumulated, and that these two dimensions of heterogeneity are positively
correlated. Our result is strongest in favor of equity that the most benevolent
in the literature since they use as the main, or unique, exogenous heterogeneity,
labor eﬃciency. As we showed, this hypothesis in our environment would reverse
the results leading to a more unequal distribution, unless a very strong deduction
is included.
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